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Abstract: This paper aims to raise awareness about the role of international and European law 
in the creation of administrative bodies that enjoy political independence. To that end, it gives 
an overview of the most important sources of this trend of ‘international impulse’. It 
furthermore aims to critically assess the validity of the arguments underpinning these 
initiatives. It distinguishes between three main motives that are generally believed to inspire 
these provisions: ensuring credibility in the implementation and monitoring of substantive 
obligations of international and European law, allowing for expertise to play a role in the 
decision-making process and avoiding conflicts of interest. It then argues that these rationales 
are often insufficient as justifications for the degree of political independence that is being 
required. Consequently, these requirements fail to meet the test of striking a proper balance 
between the principle of (representative) democracy and the benefits of political autonomy. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When the establishment of Autonomous Public Bodies (APBs) first became an epidemic in 
European democracies somewhere around the 1980s, it was to an important extent inspired 
by the theories of New Public Management (NPM) and was essentially about political choice. 
Elected politicians, i.e. parliaments and governments, deliberately delegated government 
tasks and powers to autonomous or independent agencies. Not all of these decisions were 
equally informed or thought-out. This lack of rationality is one of the most pressing critiques 
underlying many of the calls to reform arm’s length bodies in the UK and elsewhere in 
Europe.1 Creating APBs indeed soon became something of a fashion; agencies were regarded 
as ‘must-haves’ for modern state administrations. This is not to say that all valid motives for 
the creation of APBs were lacking. They were, however, seldom made explicit and it is 
assumed that behind many ‘official’ reasons given to create APBs, such as a need for 
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1 See, for instance, on reforms with such an aim of rationalisation in the devolved regions of the UK: Derek 
Birrell, ‘Devolution and quangos in the United Kingdom: the implementation of principles and policies for 
rationalization and democratization’ (2008) 29(1) Policy Studies 35; Matthew Flinders, ‘Devolution, delegation 
and the Westminster Model: a comparative analysis of developments within the UK, 1998-2009’ (2011) 4(1) 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 1, 22. Van Thiel points out that other legal systems have engaged in 
similar reforms: Sandra Van Thiel, ‘Debate: From Trendsetter to laggard? Quango reform in the UK’ (2012) 
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UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
59 
 
expertise or impartial judgment, less acceptable or elevated motivations were hidden, such as 
blame shifting for difficult or unpopular decisions.2 
 The tendency to entrust government powers to entities outside the hierarchical 
structure of central state departments occurred in many European states at about the same 
time. While the UK is often referred to as the mother land of NPM as far as Europe is 
concerned, other European administrations followed relatively quickly in adopting the modes 
of governance promoted by NPM. Recent studies have demonstrated that these states did not 
operate in isolation from each other and that the role of inter-state influence in the rising 
popularity of APBs during the last decades of the 20th century should not be underestimated. 
Gilardi’s work on delegation in the regulatory state convincingly demonstrates both 
theoretically and empirically that the concept of the independent regulator has gained 
popularity and has spread in the European legal sphere through an interdependent “diffusion 
process”.3 
 In recent years, however, many European states have engaged in a process of what is 
here labelled “national restraint” in their attitude towards (the creation of) APBs. This attitude 
is reflected in a wide range of reform initiatives that aim to rationalize choices regarding the 
establishment and governance of APBs. The trend is inspired by considerations of political 
and democratic accountability, the restoration of transparency in the administrative landscape 
and – although governments may not be keen on admitting this – savings in public 
expenditure. The key element that seems to distinguish these reforms from previous attempts 
and initiatives to (re)gain a grip on agencies and consorts in various European legal systems 
is the degree to which law plays a distinct role. This is not just the case in the rhetoric 
surrounding the reforms (often referring to constitutional legal principles such as political 
ministerial responsibility, separation of powers, legal certainty etc.) but also in the 
instruments used to implement them. Perhaps the most remarkable symptom of this 
phenomenon is the rise of so-called “framework regulation” for APBs. On one hand, Flanders 
and the Netherlands enacted a framework for (specific types of) APBs in 20034 and 20065 
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respectively, focusing on the process of set-up, institutional design and supervision of APBs. 
On the other hand, the UK has opted for legislation enabling the government to reform the 
public bodies landscape by giving it powers to abolish or merge public bodies, to modify the 
constitutional arrangements applicable to them or their funding arrangements or to modify or 
transfer their functions.6  
 Whereas Europe’s 21st century has consequently been characterised by a degree of 
reluctance to engage any further in initiatives of “autonomisation” of the administration so 
far, it has also witnessed the emergence of a new source of APBs: international and European 
(both EU and other) law. Increasingly, states find themselves being subject to clear-cut 
obligations to establish APBs originating from legislation or even case law issued at the 
international or European level. Alternatively, international or European institutions issue soft 
law instruments strongly encouraging states to entrust the implementation of their substantive 
obligations under international/European law to APBs. What was once a matter of political 
choice has now, in some instances, become a legal requirement.  
 This contribution focuses on the two main fields in which such impulses can be found 
at present: economic regulation and human rights monitoring or supervision. It begins with an 
overview of the requirements that can currently be derived from the relevant legislation, case 
law and policy documents. Subsequently, it offers a critical appreciation of this trend, which 
revolves around the validity of the motives inspiring the requirements regarding political 
independence. Firstly, however, the notion of APBs itself should be defined. 
 
B. DEFINING AUTONOMOUS PUBLIC BODIES 
APBs are entities distinct from the core administration, but with an institutional tie with the 
government apparatus, that are entrusted with government tasks of executive nature but that 
perform these tasks with a certain degree of autonomy in relation to elected politicians. APB 
is here used as an umbrella term that is meant to cover a wide range of arm’s length bodies, 
both departmental and non-departmental. The only requirement for a qualification as an APB 
is a degree of operational autonomy and the disposal of a proper, distinct responsibility for an 
aspect of the public task, irrespective of whether (even day-to-day) decisions embedded in 
that task are subject to a requirement of prior approval, veto powers, guidance, directions or 
other supervisory powers of whatever type. Consequently, the concept of APBs covers 
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executive (departmental) agencies as well as independent regulators for instance. Naturally, 
and particularly from a constitutional law perspective, the latter are more controversial and 
give rise to more questions amongst legal scholars than the former. Nevertheless, this 
contribution aims to analyse the impact of international and European law on the 
phenomenon of arm’s length bodies as a whole. Therefore, a broad definition of APBs is 
required since the obligations concerned vary from moderate and sometimes vague 
requirements of political autonomy to radical demands implying almost complete immunity 
from political influence. 
 
C. (TOP-DOWN) INTERNATIONAL OR EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON THE 
CREATION OF APBS: AN OVERVIEW 
1. Economic Regulators 
In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, many Western European economies gradually became 
subject to a wave of liberalisation initiatives that resulted in a radical change in the role of the 
state, especially in the utilities industries. More specifically, a shift took place from the 
paradigm of public ownership7 to that of regulation.8 As a regulator, the government in a 
figurative sense positions itself ‘above’ the market, controlling and monitoring the activities 
of the market players. The basic idea behind regulation is that competitive markets suffer 
from market failures, 9  and thus are imperfect. 10  So-called public interest theory regards 
regulation as necessary in order to secure the public interest, which is threatened by the 
possibility of the liberalised market not generating the desired results.11  
 The EU has played an important role in the “‘paradigm shift’ from the Keynesian to 
the regulatory state.”12 EU liberalisation legislation was enacted – often spread over different 
                                                 
7 Public ownership became the norm soon after World War II. For the UK, see e.g. Dawn Oliver, ‘Regulation, 
democracy and democratic oversight in the UK’ in Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser and Richard Rawlings (eds), The 
Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (OUP 2010), 247-248. 
8 Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and Regulatory Institutions in the 
European Union’ (1997) 3 Eipascope 1, 1. 
9 Marc Allen Eisner, ‘Beyond the logic of the market: toward an institutional analysis of regulatory reforms’ in 
David Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011), 130; Tony Prosser, 
‘Models of Economic and Social Regulation’ in Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser and Richard Rawlings (eds), The 
Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (OUP 2010), 37. 
10 Matthias Finger, ‘Towards a European model of regulatory governance?’ in David Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook 
on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011), 529. 
11  E.g. Fabrizio Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State. Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western 
Europe (Edward Elgar 2008) 16 with references, pointing out that market failures arise when a competitive 
market does not lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources, and are caused by several factors. 
12 After Paul Magnette, ‘The Politics of Regulation in the European Union’ in Damien Geradin, Rodolphe 
Muñoz and Nicolas Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European 
Governance (Edward Elgar 2005), 4. The term ‘regulatory state’ was first introduced by Majone in his article 
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“generations” or “packages” – and enforced, with the aim of completing the internal 
market.13 However, as far as sector specific regulation is concerned (as opposed to general 
competition law), the EU largely depends on the Member States to implement the legislation. 
Institutionally, the regulatory state in the EU is consequently governed by means of a system 
of so-called “shared administration”. 14  Years before the first EU legislation made any 
reference to them, however, the practice of entrusting separate, specialised administrative 
entities with regulatory tasks was already well established in many Member States. These 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) had been set up in various European countries at about 
the same time, often inspired by the British example.15 NRAs were typically designed as 
APBs, enjoying various degrees of political independence. Gradually, EU law began to 
formulate requirements on the legal status of NRAs, eventually obliging Member States to 
grant considerable autonomy to their NRAs and to insulate them as much as possible from 
(day-to-day) political input and supervision. 
 The development of these institutional requirements has been characterised by 
asymmetry: for each sector, they have evolved at a different pace, implying that some 
industries are currently subject to far-reaching, fully developed rules on NRA independence, 
whereas others are not. Nevertheless, what all sectors seem to have in common is that 
obligations regarding political independence are typically preceded by requirements of sector 
independence, i.e. a sufficient institutional and operational distance from the regulated 
parties. The following overview will not discuss these requirements, nor the historical 
developments for each sector, but will limit itself to a status quaestionis and focus exclusively 
on NRAs’ political independence. 
 
a) Energy (gas and electricity) 
Article 35 of Directive 2009/72,16 containing the current framework for the liberalisation of 
the electricity sector, provides that each Member State shall designate a single national 
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14 Also referred to as ‘mixed administration’: Jan Jans, Roel de Lange, Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, 
Europeanisation of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing 2007) 29, 32. 
15 Tony Prosser, ‘Models of Economic and Social Regulation’ in Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser and Richard 
Rawlings (eds), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (OUP 2010) 34, 34. 
16 See art 35 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55. 
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regulatory authority at national level and shall guarantee the independence of the regulatory 
authority, as well as ensure that it exercises its powers impartially and transparently. For that 
purpose, Member States have to ensure that the regulatory authority is legally distinct and 
functionally independent from any other public or private entity and that it ensures that its 
staff and the persons responsible for its management act independently from any market 
interest and do not seek or take direct instructions from any government or other public or 
private entity when carrying out the regulatory tasks. In order to protect the independence of 
the regulatory authority, Member States in particular have to ensure that the regulatory 
authority can make autonomous decisions, independently from any political body. Other 
safeguards that have to protect the body’s independence concern its budget, human and 
financial resources as well as the appointment, tenure and dismissal of its board members. 
Article 39 of Directive 2009/7317 contains identical obligations for the gas sector.  
 
b) Electronic communications 
In its current version, Article 3 of the Framework Directive,18 governing the liberalisation of 
the electronic communications sector, provides that Member States shall ensure that each of 
the tasks assigned to national regulatory authorities in the Directive itself and the Specific 
Directives is undertaken by a competent body. Member States have to guarantee the 
independence of NRAs by ensuring that they are legally distinct from, and functionally 
independent of, all organisations providing electronic communications networks, equipment 
or services. Member States that retain ownership or control of undertakings providing 
electronic communications networks and/or services are under the obligation to ensure 
effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with 
ownership or control.19 
 Since its revision in 2009,20 Article 3 of the Framework Directive contains a new 
paragraph 3a anchoring specific requirements for the independence of NRAs in their 
                                                 
17 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, [2009] OJ L211/94. 
18  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), [2002] OJ 
L108/33. 
19 Arjan Geveke, ‘Improving Implementation by National Regulatory Authorities’ (2003) 3 Eipascope 26, 28-
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20 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/140/EC of 25 November 2009 amending 
Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
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L337/37. 
International and European Impulse with Regard to the Creation of Autonomous Public 
Bodies: an Emerging Trend 
64 
relationship to the government. The article states that, without prejudice to the provisions of 
paragraphs 4 and 5, NRAs responsible for ex ante market regulation or for the resolution of 
disputes between undertakings in accordance with Article 20 or 21 of the Directive shall act 
independently and shall not seek or take instructions from any other body in relation to the 
exercise of the tasks assigned to them under national law implementing Community law. 
However, the article adds, this does not prevent supervision in accordance with national 
constitutional law. Nonetheless, only appeal bodies set up in accordance with Article 4 shall 
have the power to suspend or overturn decisions by the national regulatory authorities. 
Additional safeguards, comparable to those provided for the energy NRAs (supra) apply.  
 Directives 2009/72 and 2009/73 anchor the NRAs’ independence vis-à-vis the 
government more explicitly and specifically than the Framework Directive. However, the 
prohibition to receive instructions in the latter is formulated in such general wording that it is 
likely to apply to the relationship with public institutions as well. Moreover, the preamble of 
Directive 2009/140 (the most recent directive to revise the Framework Directive) states that:  
“[E]xpress provision should be made in national law to ensure that, in the exercise of 
its tasks, a national regulatory authority responsible for ex-ante market regulation or 
for resolution of disputes between undertakings is protected against external 
intervention or political pressure liable to jeopardise its independent assessment of 
matters coming before it.”21 
 
c) Railway Transport 
As far as railway transport is concerned, it follows from Article 30(1) of Directive 
2001/14/EC22 that the regulatory body, which Member States are obliged to establish, can be 
the Ministry responsible for transport matters or any other body, but shall be independent in 
its organisation, funding decisions, legal structure and decision-making from any 
infrastructure manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant. Independence vis-à-vis 
elected politicians or the government is consequently not explicitly required. Recently, 
however, Directive 2009/34/EU23 has introduced an enhanced independence requirement also 
targeting the regulator’s relationship with political or public bodies. Pursuant to article 55(1), 
                                                 
21 Ibid, Recital 13. Italics added. 
22 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2001/14/EC of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of 
railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety 
certification, [2001] OJ L75/29. 
23  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2012/34/EU of 21 November 2012 
establishing a single European railway area, [2012] OJ L343/32. 
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the national regulatory body for the railway sector shall be a stand-alone authority which is, 
in organisational, functional, hierarchical and decision-making terms, legally distinct and 
independent from any other public or private entity. It shall also be independent in its 
organisation, funding decisions, legal structure and decision-making from any infrastructure 
manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant. It shall furthermore be functionally 
independent from any competent authority involved in the award of a public service contract. 
The staff is prohibited from seeking or taking instructions from any government or other 
public or private entity when carrying out the functions of the regulatory body. Supporting 
safeguards, again similar to those figuring in the Directives for energy and electronic 
communications, are required. At present, the Directive is still being transposed in the 
Member States.24 
 
d) Audiovisual media and postal services 
Today, the Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive 25  does not (yet) contain an 
explicit provision obliging Member States to set up an independent national media regulator. 
However, political26 independence seems to be “presumed” by Article 30 of the Directive. 
The article requires that Member States take appropriate measures to provide each other and 
the Commission with the information necessary for the application of the provisions of the 
directive, in particular Articles 2, 3 and 4, in particular through their competent independent 
regulatory bodies (italics added). Pursuant to the preamble, Member States are moreover free 
to choose the form of their competent independent regulatory bodies and that close 
cooperation between competent regulatory bodies of the Member States and the Commission 
is necessary to ensure the correct application of the Directive.27 Some authors interpret this to 
mean that Member States are free to choose whether they want to create regulatory bodies or 
                                                 
24 The transposition should be finalised by 16 June 2015 (arti 64). There are traces in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice that even under the regime of Directive 2001/14, the railway regulators had to enjoy a 
certain degree of political independence, more specifically when there was a risk of conflicts of interest. 
Compare Case C-369/11 Commission v Italy (ECJ, 3 October 2013), paras 49-70 and Case C-545/10 
Commission v Czech Republic (ECJ, 11 July 2013), paras 89-105.  
25 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2010/13/EU of 10 March 2010 on the coordination 
of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the 
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), [2010] OJ L95/1. 
26 See the original Commission proposal COM (2005) 646. From recital 47 of the explanatory memorandum of 
the proposal, one can derive that the notion of independence referred to concerns both the audiovisual media 
providers and the national governments. There is no reason why the current reference in the preamble to the 
‘independent’ NRAs would not concern both relationships as well. 
27 Recitals 94 en 95. Italics added. 
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not, but that – if they do – the NRA has to be independent by definition.28 According to the 
INDIREG study,29 the AVMS Directive does not contain a strict formal obligation for the 
Member States to create an independent regulatory body if one does not already exist.30 
 For the postal sector, Directive 2008/6/EC31 inserted a new Article 22 in Directive 
97/67/EC32, requiring Member States to designate one or more national regulatory authorities 
for the postal sector that are legally separate from and operationally independent of the postal 
operators. Member States that retain ownership or control of postal service providers shall 
ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory functions from activities associated 
with ownership or control. This obligation clearly aims to create a level playing field and to 
avoid bias in favour of one or more of the incumbents.33 Political independence as such is not 
yet required for postal regulators. 
 
2. Human Rights Monitoring Bodies or Supervisors 
If legal scholarship is only marginally aware of the increasing influence of international and 
European law on matters of administrative organization in general and ABPs in particular, 
this is a fortiori the case for those occurring in human rights law. As Cardenas points out, “… 
we need a much better understanding of how international actors like the UN, which has been 
at the forefront of these human rights activities, actually engage in national institution 
                                                 
28 See Karol Jakubowicz, Keynote Speech (Plenary Session: ‘The Independence Regulatory Authorities’, 25th 
Meeting of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA), Prague, 16-19 May 2007).  
<epra3-production.s3.amazonaws.com/attachments/files/1380/original/EPRA_keynote_KJ.pdf?1323685662> 
accessed 2 August 2014. 
29 Full title: ‘Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory 
bodies for the purpose of enforcing the rules in the AVMS Directive’. See the website: 
<http://www.indireg.eu>. The INDIREG study, ordered by the European Commission, pursued three general 
objectives: a detailed legal description and analysis of the audiovisual media services regulatory bodies in the 
Member States, in candidate and potential candidate countries to the European Union and in the EFTA countries 
as well as four non-European countries (1), an analysis of the effective implementation of the legal framework 
in these countries (2) and the identification of key characteristics constituting an ‘independent regulatory body’ 
in the light of the AVMS Directive (3). In February 2011, the final report became available. See 
<http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/regulators/final_report.pdf>. 
30 See page 7 of the final report. The report does however suggest that the basic requirement of independence of 
AVMS-regulatory bodies could find a broader legal basis in article 10 ECHR and art 288, para 3 TFEU, 
especially when read in connection with the objectives of the AVMS Directive; Saskia Lavrijssen and Annetje 
Ottow, ‘Independent Supervisory Authorities: A Fragile Concept’ (2012) 39(4) Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 419, 434 with reference to the INDIREG report. 
31 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2008/6/EC of 20 February 2008 amending Directive 
97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services [2008] OJ 
L52/3. 
32  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 97/67/EC of 15 December 1997 on 
common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the 
improvement of quality of service [1998] OJ L15/14. 
33 See recital 47 of the preamble of Directive 2008/6/EC: ‘In accordance with the principle of separation of 
regulatory and operational functions, Member States should guarantee the independence of the national 
regulatory authorities, thereby ensuring the impartiality of their decisions.’ 
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building.”34 Typically, APBs operating in the field of human rights do not possess coercive 
powers similar to those invested in economic regulators (i.e. rule-making, the power to 
impose fines, to grant or refuse licenses etc.), although there are important exceptions to that 
rule, such as data protection authorities. These APBs can furthermore have a general remit or 
one that is rights-specific (monitoring exclusively, for instance, the right not to be 
discriminated against).  
 In this particular field, impulses to establish APBs directed to European states 
originate from four different sources or institutions: the United Nations, the EU, the political 
organs of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
a) United Nations 
i) Paris Principles 
The “mother document” of human rights institutions as a phenomenon an sich is undoubtedly 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134, containing the so-called “Paris Principles”.35 
Despite their non-binding nature, these principles have been quite influential, if only because 
the standards that they introduce have stood as a model for many other instruments requiring 
the set-up of human rights monitoring bodies.  
 The Paris Principles recommend that states establish a national institution with a 
competence to promote and protect human rights. They encourage them to give this 
institution as broad a mandate as possible and to anchor its composition and sphere of 
competence in a text with constitutional or legislative value. This national institution should 
be entrusted with a list of responsibilities, enumerated in the text of the Principles. That these 
institutions should be established as APBs follows from the provisions on the guarantees that 
states have to provide regarding the independence of their national human rights institution, 
which includes independence from government.  
 The Paris Principles do not require human rights institutions to be invested with 
binding decision-making powers. However, they do suggest that institutions with quasi-
jurisdictional competences could be entrusted with such a power, exercised within the limits 
prescribed by the law, instead of (merely) having the possibility to seek amicable settlement 
through conciliation. 
 
                                                 
34 Sonia Cardenas, ‘Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions’ 
(2003) 9 Global Governance 23, 23. 
35  General Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993 encouraging states to establish independent 
national human rights institutions. 
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ii) Other UN instruments 
In terms of treaty provisions, two important texts requiring Member States to set up 
(politically) independent implementing institutions are worth mentioning.  
 Article 33.2 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities36 obliges 
contracting states to maintain, strengthen, designate or establish, in accordance with their 
legal and administrative systems, a framework, including one or more independent 
mechanisms as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the 
Convention. When designating or establishing such a mechanism, State Parties have to take 
into account the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for 
protection and promotion of human rights (i.e. the Paris Principles). 
 Pursuant to Article 17 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,37 each party shall maintain, 
designate or establish one or several independent national preventive mechanisms for the 
prevention of torture at the domestic level. Article 18 requires State Parties to guarantee the 
functional independence of the national preventive mechanism as well as the independence of 
their personnel. When establishing national preventive mechanisms, States Parties will have 
to give due consideration to the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the 
promotion and protection of human rights (again: the Paris Principles). 
 
b) EU 
i) The Data Protection Directive 
Article 28 of Directive 95/46/EC,38 the so-called Data Protection Directive, obliges Member 
States to provide that one or more public authorities are responsible for monitoring the 
application within their territory of the provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to 
the Directive. These authorities shall act with complete independence in exercising the 
functions entrusted to them. Apart from advising their respective governments whenever new 
legislation regarding data protection is drafted, these entities have an important supervisory 
task, for which they are invested with specific powers, such as investigative powers, effective 
                                                 
36 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 13 December 2006 by resolution A/RES/61/106 
37 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December by resolution 
A/RES/57/199. 
38 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 
281/31. 
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powers of intervention (entailing the power of ordering the blocking, erasure or destruction of 
data, imposing a temporary or definitive ban on processing, of warning or admonishing the 
controller etc.) and the power to engage in legal proceedings. 
 In 2012, the European Commission launched a proposal for a new Data Protection 
Directive. 39  Some of the proposed amendments concern the further definition of the 
independence concept that currently figures in Article 28; the new proposal dedicates a 
separate section to the independence of the national supervisory authorities. Pursuant to 
Article 40 of the proposal, Member States for instance have to ensure that the supervisory 
authority acts with complete independence in exercising the duties and powers entrusted to it 
(paragraph 1). Each Member State shall moreover provide that the members of the 
supervisory authority, in the performance of their duties, neither seek nor take instructions 
from anybody (paragraph 2). Member States are under the obligation to ensure that the 
supervisory authority is subject to financial control which shall not affect its independence.40 
In the explanatory memorandum, the Commission confirms that Article 40 “clarifies the 
conditions for the independence of supervisory authorities, implementing case law of the 
Court of Justice of the EU.”41 This case law is discussed infra. 
 
ii) Anti-discrimination law 
The current EU Directives on equality and non-discrimination contain provisions regarding 
the set-up of supervisors as well. Pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC42 (racial 
discrimination), Member States shall designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal 
treatment of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. 
These bodies may form part of agencies charged at national level with the defence of human 
                                                 
39 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of 
such data, 24 January 2012, COM/2012/010 final – 2012/0010 (COD). 
40 Article 41 furthermore anchors some general conditions with regard to the members of the supervisory 
authority. Member States for instance have to provide that the members of the supervisory authority must be 
appointed either by the parliament or the government of the Member State concerned (para 1). The members 
furthermore have to be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and whose experience and 
skills required to perform their duties are demonstrated (para 2). The article furthermore contains some 
provisions on the expiry of the term of office (paras 3-5). Dismissal of a member for instance is only possible if 
the member no longer fulfills the conditions required for the performance of the duties or is guilty of serious 
misconduct. Pursuant to art 42, the establishment and status of the supervisory authority in accordance with arts 
39 and 40 have to be provided by law. 
41 See 11 of the proposal. In the Netherlands, Kranenborg predicted that this case law would play a role in the 
revision of the directive: HR Kranenborg, ‘Commission v Germany’ [2010] SEW 419. 
42  Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. 
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rights or the safeguarding of individuals' rights. Their status is not further elaborated on, but 
the Article does require that Member States ensure that the body can perform its competences 
(providing assistance to victims, conducting surveys, and publishing reports and making 
recommendations) independently. Political independence is not specifically required, but 
given the lack of further qualification or limitation of the independence requirement, it is 
likely that it is, at least to some extent, expected. Similar provisions are found in Article 12 of 
Directive 2004/113/EC43 and Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC44 (gender discrimination). 
 
c) Council of Europe 
As a political organ, the Council of Europe has firstly contributed to the spread of human 
rights institutions with a general mandate, as envisaged by the UN Paris Principles, via 
Recommendation No. R (97) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
establishment of independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights. 45  This regional recognition or ratification of the principles has not remained 
unnoticed.46 As de Beco points out, the Council of Europe “built on already agreed principles 
regarding NHRIs, which it decided to promote in its Member States.”47 The Recommendation 
refers to the UN Paris Principles and recommends the establishment of “independent 
institutions, established according to law for the promotion and protection of human rights 
[…], to be responsible for, inter alia, drawing the public authorities’ attention to, and advising 
them on, human rights matters and promoting the provision of human rights information and 
education for the public.” 
 
i) Media regulation 
The Council promoted the creation of the independent media regulator, the first more specific 
type of institution. Media regulators are regarded as indispensable for the protection of the 
freedom of expression, enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
                                                 
43 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37. 
44 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation [2006] OJ L204/23. 
45 Recommendation No. R (1997) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the establishment of 
independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, adopted on 30 September 
1997. 
46 e.g. Linda Reif, ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good 
Governance and Human Rights Protection’ (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 5. 
47 Gauthier de Beco, ‘National Human Rights Institutions in Europe’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 331, 
336 with reference to the Paris Principles and other initiatives. 
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Rights, which includes the freedom to receive and impart information. The Council has acted 
as a forum for European states to exchange ideas on regulatory independence of media 
regulators. Its main role in this process has been to provide a forum for cross-fertilisation 
between contracting states (e.g. from Western and Eastern European legal traditions).48 This 
particular role is closely linked to a more vertical process of encouragement, reflected in the 
adoption of Recommendation No. R (2000) 23 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting 
sector,49 prepared by the Intergovernmental Group of Specialists on Media in a Pan-European 
Perspective (MM-S-EP).  
 The preamble of this Recommendation recognises that Member States of the Council 
of Europe have established regulatory authorities in different ways, according to their legal 
systems and democratic and cultural traditions. Consequently, there is diversity with regard to 
the means by which - and the extent to which - independence, effective powers and 
transparency are achieved. The Committee of Ministers recommends Member States, if they 
have not already done so, establish independent regulatory authorities for the broadcasting 
sector. The Recommendation contains specific guidelines regarding the independence and 
functions of regulatory authorities. They concern the devising of a general legislative 
framework, the appointment, composition and functioning of the NRAs, their financial 
independence, powers and competence and accountability. An extensive explanatory 
memorandum elaborates the different guidelines. 
 
ii) Anti-discrimination law 
In 1997, the ECRI, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance – 
institutionally embedded in the Council of Europe – produced General Policy 
Recommendation No. 2. This document provided for the creation of specialised bodies to 
combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance at the national level.50 Referring 
to – amongst other instruments – the Paris Principles, the ECRI recommends states “to 
consider carefully the possibility of setting up a speciali[s]ed body to combat racism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance at national level, if such a body does not already 
                                                 
48 This dynamic was discussed in Stéphanie De Somer, ‘The Europeanisation of the law on national independent 
regulatory authorities from a vertical and horizontal perspective’ (2012) 2 Review of European Administrative 
Law 93. 
49 Recommendation No. R (2000) 23 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the independence and 
functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, adopted on 20 December 2000. 
50 General Policy Recommendation No. 2 on specialized bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism 
and intolerance at national level, adopted on 13 June 1997. 
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exist.”51 In the appendix to the recommendation, basic principles concerning these specialised 
bodies are set out. Specialised bodies should for instance function without interference from 
the state and with all the guarantees necessary for their independence including the freedom 
to appoint their own staff, to manage their resources as they think fit and to express their 
views publicly. 52  They should also ensure that they operate in a way which is clearly 
politically independent.53 In the 2002 General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on national 
legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination,54 the Commission re-emphasised the 
need for a national specialised body.55 
 
d) European Court of Human Rights 
Quite recently, the criterion of institutional or political independence for bodies involved in 
the implementation of specific human rights obligations has also made its appearance in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This subtle evolution has not yet seen any 
systematic development, but should nonetheless be noted. So far, the Court has identified 
what seems an obligation to establish an APB in at least four cases. 
 In AA v Greece, 56  a decisive consideration for the Court to decide whether the 
applicant had access to effective remedies under domestic law was the lack, in Greece, of an 
independent mechanism to control detention premises and to investigate complaints against 
police officers.57 In a related case, Dulaş v Turkey58, concerning Article 13 of the Convention 
(which provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority), the Court ruled that the 
Turkish Administrative Council (made up of civil servants hierarchically dependent on the 
governor, an executive officer linked to the security forces which were under investigation), 
could not be regarded as independent.59 
 In the case of Tysiąc v Poland60, the applicant’s claim was at least partly based on a 
violation of her right to respect for her private life. The Court pointed out that “while Article 
                                                 
51 ibid, 4. 
52 Principle 5.2 of the Appendix, 7. 
53 Principle 7.3 of the Appendix, 7. 
54 General Policy Recommendation No. 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, 
adopted on 13 December 2002. 
55 ibid, 8. 
56 AA v Greece, App no 12186/08 (ECtHR, 22 July 2010).  
57 ibid, para 45. 
58 Dulaş v Turkey, App no 25801/94 (ECtHR, 30 January 2001). 
59 ibid, para 14 with reference to Güleç v Turkey, App no 21593/93 (ECtHR 27 July 1998), paras 77-82; Oğur v 
Turkey, App no 21594/93 (ECtHR 20 May 1999) paras 85-93. 
60 Tysiąc v Poland, App no 5410/03 (ECtHR 20 March 2007). 
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8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, it is important for the effective enjoyment of 
the rights guaranteed by this provision that the relevant decision-making process is fair and 
such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by it.”61 Subsequently, the Court 
made reference to its previous case law,62 from which it could be derived that “the concepts 
of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society command that measures affecting 
fundamental human rights be, in certain cases, subject to some form of procedure before an 
independent body competent to review the reasons for the measures and the relevant 
evidence.”63  
 Perhaps, though, the most notorious case in which the Court identified an obligation 
to establish an APB is that of Odièvre v France,64 also involving Article 8 of the Convention. 
The case concerned a woman who had been abandoned by her biological mother that applied 
to the French administration for information to identify her mother. The mother herself, 
however, had requested at the time of the abandonment that the birth remain a secret. After an 
assessment of all the interests at stake, the Court did not find a violation of Article 8. It 
ascertained that French legislation had recently established the National Council for Access 
to Information about Personal Origins, “an independent body composed of members of the 
national legal service, representatives of associations having an interest in the subject matter 
of the law and professional people with good practical knowledge on the issues” 65  and 
regarded this as an important guarantee for persons in the applicant’s position. In the previous 
judgment Mikulić,66 case cited by the Court in Odièvre,67 it was found that an independent 
authority had to be established to speedily determine paternity claims, for the situation in 
which an alleged father would not want to follow a court order to have a DNA test.  
 In all the cases discussed, the European Court suggested that certain public decisions 
which interfere with a person’s individual rights should be made by an independent organ. 
The Court speaks of independent “mechanisms”, “organs” “bodies”, or “authorities”. It is not 
quite clear, especially in those cases where the decision to be taken has to do with a 
                                                 
61 ibid, para 113. 
62 Rotaru v Romania, App no 28341/95 (ECtHR 4 May 2000) paras 55-63. In this case, the Court states that “the 
rule of law implies, inter alia, that interference by the executive authorities with an individual's rights should be 
subject to effective supervision, which should normally be carried out by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, 
since judicial control affords the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure” (para 
59). In the Tysiąc however, the Court seems to point in the direction of independent bodies composed of (in 
casu medical) specialists, rather than to courts or tribunals. 
63 ibid, para 117. 
64 Odièvre v France, App no 42326/98 (ECtHR 13 February 2013). 
65 ibid, para 49. 
66 Mikulić v Croatia, App no 53176/99 (ECtHR 7 February 2002). 
67 ibid, para 42. 
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complaint filed by an applicant (the cases regarding exhaustion of domestic remedies and the 
availability of an effective remedy), whether these bodies – according to the Court – should 
be considered part of the executive or should have the characteristics of judicial bodies. 
Nevertheless, in none of the cases is reference made to the independence requirement of 
Article 6 of the Convention (which moreover only applies to civil rights and criminal 
proceedings). Hence, the Court does not seem to oblige Member States to entrust these tasks 
to the judiciary. It moreover seems likely that at least controlling detention premises (AA), 
reviewing medical evidence on the basis of which an abortion decision should be taken 
(Tysiąc) and making decisions on the release of data on a person’s birth and origin (Odièvre) 
are tasks which would typically, at least at first instance, be entrusted to bodies of the 
executive. In Odièvre, the Court itself referred to the French National Council for Access to 
Information about Personal Origins, consisting of representatives of interest groups and 
professionals with practical knowledge. Such a composition, allowing for practical expertise 
and interest representation, is typical of many APBs. 
 
D. APPRECIATION AND EVALUATION 
1. Towards an Increased Scrutiny of the Motives Inspiring the Creation of APBs 
The influence of international and European law on matters of administrative organisation 
has not been recognised and studied in depth in legal literature. It is, however, an ongoing 
evolution with important legal implications. Far from being a neutral or value-free trend, 
some of the hard and soft law obligations outlined in this contribution raise serious concerns. 
Apart from possible questions regarding the institutional autonomy of Member States or 
contracting states in inter- or supranational law, a principle closely linked to that of state 
sovereignty and one that used to be upheld fiercely in EU law especially,68 these provisions 
touch upon more fundamental legal principles as well. The most glaring issues concern the 
democratic legitimacy of APBs. 
 Most of the literature that has recognised and addressed the tension between APB 
status and the need for democratic accountability, whether in international, European or 
purely domestic contexts, has subsequently attempted to formulate alternatives for political 
supervision. The most common of candidates to perform this function have been an increased 
focus on outputs or outcomes, a reinforcement of APBs’ procedural legitimacy, as well as 
                                                 
68 See e.g. Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Sweet & Maxwell 
2005) 530. 
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their legal accountability, and ensuring some form of network accountability (either 
separately or combined).69  Although many of these suggestions are laudable, this author 
would argue that they are often looking for substitutes where none are needed. In other 
words: where there is a lot of focus on finding a proper replacement for political input, there 
is only little contemplation of the preceding question, i.e. whether and to what extent the 
motives inspiring the legislature or government to establish a particular APB justify the 
degree of political independence attributed. The actual decision to create an APB and – more 
importantly – to give it either a limited or a substantial autonomy vis-à-vis elected politicians 
seems to deserve more scrutiny from parliaments, governments and legal scholarship than it 
has up until now received. 
 Reflections on why certain parts of the administration should enjoy autonomy from 
political principals, i.e. the motives behind the creation of APBs, have traditionally been 
developed in the discipline of political science or public administration. The question arises 
whether and to what extent these should become topics of interest for legal academia as well. 
This author argues that this is the case because such initiatives always to a certain extent 
constitute deviations from a basic constitutional premise of administrative organisation that 
democracies in the European legal sphere share: its subordination to political authority, which 
ultimately ensures compliance with the will of the elected representative(s) of the people.70 
Whereas it is fully recognised that the hierarchical subordination of the administration in a 
Weberian sense is no longer achievable for the totality of the government’s radius of action, it 
remains the rule; a rule that is deeply embedded in the democratic configuration of European 
societies. Therefore, the decision to entrust government tasks to arm’s length bodies, 
                                                 
69  Examples of contributions on this subject are numerous. See e.g. Christina Spyrelli ‘Regulating the 
regulators? An assessment of institutional structures and procedural rules of national regulatory authorities’ 
(2003/04) 8 International Journal of Communications Law and Policy; Martino Maggetti, ‘Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review’ [2010] 2 Living Reviews in 
Democracy <http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2010-4> accessed 2 August 2014; Paul Magnette, ‘The Politics 
of Regulation in the European Union’ in Damien Geradin, Rodolphe Muñoz and Nicolas Petit (eds), Regulation 
through Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European Governance (Edward Elgar 2005), 13; Tony Prosser, 
‘Regulation and legitimacy’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (OUP 2011), 
321; Richard Mulgan, Holding power to account: accountability in modern democracies (Palgrave Macmillan 
2003) 170; Saskia Lavrijssen and Annetje Ottow, ‘The Legality of Independent Regulatory Authorities’ in 
Leonard Besselink, Frans Pennings en Sacha Prechal (eds), The eclipse of the legality principle in the European 
Union (Kluwer 2011), 94-95; Yannis Papadopoulos, ‘Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and 
Multilevel Governance’ (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 469, 477; Colin Scott, ‘Regulatory Governance and 
the Challenge of Constitutionalism’ in Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser and Richard Rawlings (eds), The Regulatory 
State: Constitutional Implications (OUP 2010), 33; Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ‘Promoting 
Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach’ (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 542, 545-
546. 
70 Some constitutional texts enshrine this principle quite explicitly. Article 20 French 1958 Constitution for 
instance states that the government ‘disposes’ of the administration, while immediately adding that the 
government is responsible before Parliament. 
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distancing them from elected representatives, constituting the exception, should be subject to 
careful consideration and rigorous justification. Only when it is established that distancing 
the administration from politics is expedient in the light of a particular (valid) motive, does 
reflection on guarantees and mechanisms that compensate for the loss of democratic 
legitimation via political input become relevant. 
 Above, reference was made to the recent phenomenon of framework legislation 
regarding APBs. Despite the differences in scope and approach between the Flemish, Dutch 
and UK frameworks, they share at least one common goal: restoring the primacy of politics in 
public administration as well as political ministerial responsibility for executive acts. All 
three statutory instruments aim to rationalise the decision of creating (or – for the Public 
Bodies Act – abolishing or reforming) autonomous public bodies, offering a framework for 
assessment in which the benefits of political autonomy have to be weighed against the risks 
for democratic accountability. One of the main ideas behind the trend of “national restraint” 
in general, and behind the framework regulation enacted in particular, is consequently that 
creating APBs, an act that logically detracts from the principle of representative democracy, 
is only justified if sufficiently valid reasons underlie the initiative. APBs are increasingly 
regarded as institutions that have to remain exceptions to the rule that the administration 
functions under the hierarchic command of ministers that are either elected, or directly 
controlled by an elected assembly. 
 
2. A Critical Appreciation of the Motives Underlying the Trend of “International and 
European Impulse” 
This plea for close scrutiny definitely applies to the instruments or sources discussed above. 
Many of these seem to have the intention of isolating APBs from political influence and 
supervision to such an extent that they severely hollow the role of representative democracy 
in the fields concerned. This is especially so for the current EU provisions on the political 
independence of national economic regulators. The most far-reaching example is currently 
found in the energy sector, where the European Commission has issued an interpretative note 
on NRAs and the requirements surrounding their status in Directives 2009/72 and 2009/73.71 
This interpretative note is not legally binding; as the Commission itself indicates, it “aims to 
                                                 
71 Commission Staff Working Paper 22 January 2010, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas – The Regulatory Authorities. 
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enhance legal certainty but does not create any new legislative rules”.72 Nevertheless, it has 
been regarded (both by lawyers and national parliaments having to implement the Directives) 
as an important and authoritative source in determining the scope and precise meaning of the 
current obligations regarding NRAs. Possible infringement procedures initiated by the 
Commission will undoubtedly be based on arguments relying on the interpretative note. In 
this document, the Commission gives a far-reaching interpretation to the provisions regarding 
NRAs’ political independence, suggesting among other things that all supervisory powers for 
ministers, both ex ante and ex post, on their day-to-day decision-making should be excluded. 
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted a similar stance in the field of data 
protection, where the notion of “complete independence” has been the subject of 
interpretative case law. In Commission v Germany,73 the Grand Chamber of the Court argued 
that this requirement did not only preclude any influence exercised by the supervised bodies, 
as Germany had attempted to argue,74 but also any directions or any other external influence, 
whether direct or indirect, which could call into question the performance by those 
authorities, of their task consisting of establishing a fair balance between the protection of the 
right to private life and the free movement of personal data.75 According to the Court, the 
German system of state scrutiny, with regard to the body supervising data protection in the 
private sector, was irreconcilable with this broad concept of independence. In a second 
judgment, Commission v Austria,76 the Court, referring to Commission v Germany, ruled that 
functional independence (in Austria’s case signifying that the law guarantees that the 
authority’s members are not bound by instructions of any kind in the performance of their 
duties) is essential, but “is not by itself sufficient to protect that supervisory authority from all 
external influence.”77 According to the Court, the notion of “complete independence” “is 
intended to preclude not only direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also […] any 
indirect influence which is liable to have an effect on the supervisory authority’s decision”.78 
For that reason, the fact that the managing member of the data protection authority – 
responsible for managing its day-to-day business – was  supervised by a hierarchical superior 
of the department to which he belonged was deemed contrary to Article 28 of the Data 
                                                 
72 ibid, 3. 
73 Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885; Annetje Ottow and Margot Aelen, ‘Commission 
v Germany’ (2010) 11(6) European Human Rights Cases 679. 
74 Commission v Germany (n 73), para 19. 
75 ibid, para 30. 
76 Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria (ECJ, 16 October 2012).  
77 ibid, para 42. 
78 ibid, para 43. 
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Protection Directive.79 Other violations identified by the Court concerned the integration of 
the office of the Austrian Datenschutzkommission with the departments of the Federal 
Chancellery (which was itself subject to the supervision of the authority) 80  and the 
unconditional right to information given to the Federal Chancellor as to the work of the 
authority.81  
 The question now arises whether the obligations and encouragements outlined above 
share a common rationale. Why is it that they all, albeit to a different extent, regard political 
independence as a desirable feature of governance for the accomplishment of their objectives 
at national state level? And – most importantly – do these reasons suffice as justifications that 
outweigh the detriment that is done to the political foundation of the administration and, thus, 
to its embedding in the system of representative democracy? 
 It has often been suggested that the independence requirements for economic 
regulators have their own quite specific raison d’être, somewhat distinct from that 
characterising other types of APBs. This is only true to a limited extent. An argument often 
heard in literature about independent regulators in particular is that these entities are expected 
to yield more “credibility” than politically steered or controlled regulatory entities.82 More 
specifically, market players’ belief in the time-consistency of policies would increase once 
they have been entrusted to an independent regulator. Unlike politicians, it is argued, 
independent NRAs (IRAs) are not subject to short-term considerations regarding re-election. 
These theories have primarily been inspired by the work of Majone, who is often regarded as 
the founding father (in a theoretical sense) of the European regulatory state. Majone was 
among the first to point out that IRAs promote stability and continuity.83 Other authors have 
adopted and elaborated his ideas, suggesting that predictability is essential to foster 
investments.84 Pursuant to the preamble of Directive 2009/140, amending the Framework 
                                                 
79 ibid, paras 48-49. 
80 ibid, see in particular paras 57 and 61. 
81 ibid, para 63. 
82 See e.g. Paul Magnette, ‘The Politics of Regulation in the European Union’ in Damien Geradin, Rodolphe 
Muñoz and Nicolas Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European 
Governance (Edward Elgar 2005) 3, 5. 
83 e.g. Giandomenico Majone, ‘Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why Democracies Need Non-
Majoritarian Institutions’, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 96/57 (European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre 1996); Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and Regulatory 
Institutions in the European Union’ (1997) 3 Eipascope, 1, 2: “[...] independent agencies enjoy two significant 
advantages: specialised knowledge and the possibility (because of independence from partisan considerations) 
of making credible policy commitments.” 
84 Phedon Nicolaïdes, ‘Regulation of Liberalised Markets: A New Role for the State?’ in Damien Geradin, 
Rodolphe Muñoz and Nicolas Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European 
Governance (Edward Elgar 2005), 30. See also Fabrizio Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State. 
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Directive for electronic communications, “[t]he independence of the national regulatory 
authorities should be strengthened in order to ensure a more effective application of the 
regulatory framework and to increase their authority and the predictability of their 
decisions.”85 The European Commission as well, recognised expressis verbis that credible 
commitment was the main ratio behind the obligations regarding NRAs’ independence in the 
liberalisation directives.86 
 How should we evaluate this argument? Time consistency may be a desirable 
characteristic of regulatory policy from the viewpoint of law and economics or even public 
administration. However, it could be argued that its validity is doubtful from a legal point of 
view. The argument aims to insulate one particular sector and thus a particular policy field 
from the possibility of politicians changing their minds about the policies to be followed, 
even when the public interest would require them to do so. One of the basic principles of 
public law in European democracies, however, is precisely that the government’s duty to 
promote the public interest requires it to be able to change its policies at all times when it 
believes that this is necessary. In French-inspired systems this rule is enshrined in the legal 
principle (one of the so called ‘lois du service public’) of adaptabilité or mutabilité.87 
 All legal subjects have to endure changes in policy, precisely because the government 
should constantly evaluate its policies and assess whether these still serve the public interest 
in the best way possible. No individual or group of individuals should hence enjoy a 
guarantee that the policies that are valid in the sector in which he or they operate will be 
consistent for a certain period. Giving such a guarantee to one or more sectors creates 
unjustifiable inequalities and disturbs the basis of the relationship between government and 
citizen in public law. Adapting policies to contemporary needs is the core business of politics 
and politicians. Political principals are therefore not entitled to renounce all influence in a 
given public sector for the advantage of a specific group of citizens, since they are 
                                                                                                                                                        
Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe (Edward Elgar 2008) 44; Fabrizio Gilardi and Martino 
Maggetti, ‘The independence of regulatory authorities’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook on the Politics of 
Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011), 205; Mark Thatcher, ‘Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies’ (2002) 
25(1) West European Politics 125, 130-131. 
85 Directive 2009/140 (n 20) Recital 13. 
86 Commission Staff Working Paper 22 January 2010, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas – The Regulatory Authorities, 6: “These provisions on the independence of the 
NRA’s staff and persons responsible for their management are key requirements because they are aimed at 
ensuring that regulatory decisions are not affected by political and specific economic interests, thereby creating 
a stable and predictable investment climate.” 
87 For France, see e.g. Patrice Chrétien and Nicolas Chifflot, Droit Administratif (Sirey 2012) 602. For Belgium, 
see David D’Hooghe and Philip De Keyser, ‘Het continuïteitsbeginsel en het veranderlijkheidsbeginsel’ in 
Ingrid Opdebeek and Marnix Van Damme (eds), Beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur (die Keure 2006).  
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responsible for the entire public sector and vis-à-vis the entire population. Social or economic 
considerations which concern the public as a whole, can make it necessary, at a given 
moment, to adapt the policy that has been followed up until then. When this situation occurs, 
the government must be able to take action. Consequently, the consistency argument is based 
on an invalid claim. 
 Moreover, the time consistency argument rests on the belief that market players prefer 
independent regulators because they see politicians as constantly focused on getting re-
elected and willing to, even irrationally, change their policies for that reason only. However, 
this presumption does not appear to have been tested in any systematic, empirical way. What 
proof is there that market players indeed prefer regulators that enjoy complete political 
independence? Hardly any evidence has ever been produced to substantiate the claim that 
ensuring confidence in the minds of market players indeed requires precluding all political 
influence on regulatory decisions.88 An urgent call for more research on this point seems 
justified. For the time being and for the reasons explained here, the time consistency 
argument seems to constitute rather poor grounds on which to base an argument for complete 
political insulation.  
 The credibility motive, however, does not exclusively revolve around consistency. 
Expertise, often of the technical kind, is also regarded as key to ensuring that (potential) 
market players regard regulatory institutions as trustworthy and legitimate. “Independence is 
defended as a way to assure that decisions are made by neutral professionals with the time 
and technical knowledge to make competent, apolitical choices.”89 There is little doubt that in 
today’s European Union, which is typically characterised as highly technocrat, ensuring 
expertise plays a decisive role in the legislative’s (and especially the European 
Commission’s) predilection for independent regulation. 
 Involving expertise in administrative decision-making is clearly a valid motive an 
sich, since it contributes to well-thought out, evidence-based decisions. However, even in 
highly technical matters, it is not inconceivable that expert decision-making and political 
supervision can be reconciled. Guaranteeing expert decision-making does not necessarily rule 
out all forms of political input or control. Balanced forms of control, based on deliberation 
                                                 
88 Empirical research has demonstrated that limitations on policy change in political systems foster investments 
in infrastructure, without, however, claiming that such an outcome requires the establishment of politically 
independent regulators. See eg Witold J Henisz, ‘The institutional environment for infrastructure investment’ 
[2002] Industrial and Corporate Change 355. 
89 Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘The Regulatory State’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012), 676. 
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and consultation between politicians, responsible for the furtherance of the public interest and 
experts, responsible for making decisions that are technically sound, can be conceived and 
deserve further consideration. In many European legal systems, it has been quite common to 
make autonomous public bodies created for reasons of expertise subject to moderate forms of 
political supervision, such as powers of approval or homologation, suspension, veto, 
annulment etc. More knowledge is needed on whether, to what extent and under what 
circumstances such powers are either detrimental to or reconcilable with the role of experts. 
This question requires empirical testing of different theoretical models and may turn out to be 
a process of trial and error. A central concern should, however, always be the protection of 
the separate and distinct roles of experts and elected politicians in the process. 
 A potential model that could work in many cases is that which I label a “qualified 
annulment power”. 90  Such a model would allow the competent political principal (for 
instance, a minister) to annul decisions taken by the APB, but only after a compulsory prior 
consultation between both authorities has taken place. On a theoretical level, this model 
seems to offer important advantages. Firstly, is excludes censorship, since supervision takes 
place ex post facto; the APB does not need prior consent for its initial decision. Secondly, 
annulment does not allow for substitution. After the annulment, it is up to the APB, not the 
political principal to make a new decision, taking into account the motives for annulment. 
Thirdly, the compulsory consultation mitigates the unilateral character of the action (veto) of 
the political principal.91 It aims to ensure that experts and politicians genuinely become equal 
partners in debating and decision-making. Ideally, the principal’s obligation to consult before 
annulment results in a dialogue, in which both partners can share their considerations and 
concerns and which results in a solution that is both politically expedient and technically 
sound. 
 There is, however, a third reason why, especially in a European context, political 
independence of regulators may be desirable, and this motive is also reflected in EU law: the 
issue of avoiding potential conflicts of interest. Historically, the monopolists in the utilities 
markets were often government enterprises, who are currently still active as market players, 
but now in a competitive environment. If a political principal (typically a government 
                                                 
90 In Belgium and the Netherlands, for instance, autonomous public bodies are often established for reasons of 
technical or practical expertise. Both the Flemish and the Dutch Framework regulation make such bodies subject 
to powers of supervision in the hands of the responsible minister. Unless an explicit derogation is found in the 
legislation establishing the specific body, these powers are applicable. See article 23 Kaderdecreet Bestuurlijk 
Beleid 2003 (Flanders); article 17 ff. Kaderwet Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen 2006 (the Netherlands).  
91 In the Netherlands, it follows from article 10:41 (1) of the General Administrative Law Act that, in case of an 
annulment power, consultation of the administrative body that has taken the initial decision is obligatory. 
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minister), who is ultimately responsible for the success and financial wellbeing of such a 
government enterprise (one of the market players under supervision), at the same time has the 
last word in the decisions of the regulatory body, there is a real chance of a conflict of interest 
arising. “In that sense, the independence of the NRA from the legislature and the executive 
was an extension of the separation of regulatory and operational functions,” Hancher and 
Larouche point out, referring to telecoms (now electronic communications) legislation, where 
the independence requirement has for a long time been exclusively linked to ownership of or 
control over the market players.92 
 In situations where central, politically dominated government is under scrutiny from 
APBs, how can any form of political supervision be justified? At first sight, this seems a 
problem that cannot be transcended. But then again, perhaps this argument underestimates the 
potentials of modern administrative law. Administrative decision-making revolves around 
conflicting interests and the guarantees and procedures that characterise administrative law in 
the 21st century are designed precisely to ensure that governments and administrations strike 
the best possible balance. All developed systems of administrative law dispose of a principle 
or a ground of appeal on the basis of which so-called détournement de pouvoir (diversion of 
power) can be challenged. The exercise of supervisory powers that results in an 
administrative decision should be subject to judicial review. Diversion of power exists when 
a decision is not made in the general interest, but with ulterior (personal or other) motives. A 
political principal annulling or vetoing a decision of a Data Protection Authority against a 
public institution because he does not want the government to be cast in a bad light, therefore 
diverts his power. In most legal systems, moreover, a decision taken with the aim of 
promoting an aspect of the public interest, other than that for which the legislative has 
entrusted the authority with the power in question, is also vitiated by diversion of power.93 
An interference with a righteous decision to impose a fine on a government enterprise in 
order to keep it financially sound therefore qualifies as diversion of power (even though it is 
                                                 
92 Leigh Hancher and Pierre Larouche, ‘The coming of age of EU regulation of network industries and services 
of general economic interest’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The evolution of EU law (OUP 2011), 
773-774. See also Lea Rodrigue, Les aspects juridiques de la régulation européenne des réseaux (Bruylant 
2012) 5-6. 
93 E.g. André Mast, Jean Dujardin, Marnix Van Damme and Johan Vande Lanotte, Overzicht van het Belgisch 
administratief recht (Kluwer 2009) 1001-1006 (Belgium); Georges Dupuis, Marie-José Guédon and Patrice 
Chrétien, Droit administratif (Dalloz 2007) 634; Pierre-Laurent Frier and Jacques Petit, Précis de droit 
administratif (Montchrestien 2006) 459-461 (France); Gerard van Ballegooij, Tom Barkhuysen, Willemien den 
Ouden et. al., Bestuursrecht in het AWB-tijdperk (Kluwer 2008) 93-94 (the Netherlands); Stanley de Smith, 
Harry Woolf and Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial review of administrative action (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 553-556; 
Paul Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 576 (in the UK, ‘bad faith’ is used instead of 
‘diversion of power’). 
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arguably in the public interest to promote the financial health of government enterprises), 
since the power of supervision will only be entrusted to the minister with the aim of ensuring 
proper economic regulation. Zijlstra, who argues – differently and more radically than this 
contribution does – that tasks of market supervision should not be exercised at a distance 
from politics at all, substantiates his claim by referring to e.g. the prohibition of détournement 
de pouvoir, which suffices to overcome possible conflicts of interest, although the author 
admits that they can probably never be averted entirely.94 
 Admittedly, diversion of power is difficult to prove, which is precisely the reason why 
there are few examples of the procedure being applied in most legal systems. Perhaps an 
enhanced duty to state reasons could overcome these difficulties. If a minister is obliged to 
motivate his supervisory decision in the light of general policy objectives predefined by the 
legislative and succeeds in demonstrating that his interference was indeed necessary in that 
regard, it will be easier for the administrative judge to determine whether there is indeed 
diversion of power. 
 What then about human rights supervisory bodies? Even though economic regulation 
and human rights monitoring may seem to have very little in common substantively, the 
ratios underlying the requirements of political independence discussed for the latter field are 
very similar to those for economic regulation. Indeed, credibility, although comparatively less 
frequently documented in the scarce literature on human rights institutions, is a key concern 
for international and regional human rights organizations as well.95 According to Smith, the 
political neutrality of national human rights institutions and their commitment to human 
rights inspires public confidence.96 These institutions are moreover considered “more likely 
to be able to guarantee a certain expertise which is free from any politically partisan 
approach.”97 Furthermore, even more so than in the case of economic regulations, conflicts of 
                                                 
94  Sjoerd Zijlstra, ‘Zbo’s, marktautoriteiten en regelgevende bevoegdheid’ (2005) 1 Tijdschrift voor 
Ondernemingsbestuur 2, 4.  
95 E.g. Anne Smith, ‘The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?’ [2006] 
Human Rights Quarterly 904, 904, 906 and 909; Rachel Murray, ‘National Human Rights Institutions. Criteria 
and Factors for Assessing Their Effectiveness’ (2007) 25(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 189, 211; 
Sonia Cardenas, ‘Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions’ (2003) 
9 Global Governance 23, 38. See also Principle 7 of the Appendix, 7 of General Policy Recommendation No. 2 
on specialized bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance at national level, adopted on 
13 June 1997, discussed above: ‘Specialized bodies should operate in such a way as to maximize the quality of 
their research and advice and thereby their credibility both with national authorities and the communities whose 
rights they seek to preserve and enhance.’ 
96 Anne Smith, ‘The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?’ [2006] Human 
Rights Quarterly 904, 925. 
97 Brice Dickson, ‘The Contribution of Human Rights Commissions to the Protection of Human Rights’ [2003] 
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interest are a constant risk for politically controlled or steered human rights institutions. This 
is so for the very reason that human rights obligations, despite successful and less successful 
attempts to give them horizontal effect, are still primarily directed to governments. Therefore, 
they will be the main subjects of the supervision and scrutiny by bodies involved in human 
rights monitoring. Obviously, undue influence on the body’s task by the political organs 
whose conduct the body is supposed to assess in an objective way is undesirable. 98 
Considerations of credibility are moreover closely intertwined with this conflict of interests 
motive: a perception of partiality naturally negatively affects citizens’ belief in the institution. 
 It is indeed possible to argue that the case for political independence is even stronger 
for human rights monitoring bodies, given the fundamental character of the guarantees that 
are protected as well as the rights-based approach that is inherent to it and which – at first 
sight – leaves only little room and at the same time only little need for political input. 
Although there is some truth in this argument, it is at the same time undeniable that the scope 
and delineation of human rights, as well as the balancing exercise needed when human rights 
conflict, may, in particular national contexts, require and allow for political assessments to be 
made.99 Again, for the reasons mentioned above, this political input does not have to conflict 
with the valid reasons underlying the claim for a certain degree of political autonomy. 
 Moreover, one should be careful not to open Pandora’s box accepting conflicts of 
interest as valid ratios for political autonomy of administrative bodies, by giving the concept 
an unduly broad application and interpretation. In Commission v Germany, cited above, the 
European Court of Justice identified several possible conflicts of interest in the relationship 
between central government and the German data protection authority, responsible for the 
private sector only.100 The Court referred to the possible involvement of the government in 
Public-Private Partnerships, which would make it inclined to be lenient vis-à-vis 
infringements of data protection legislation by its private partner. The Court also referred to 
the government’s interest in obtaining access to data for use in tax and criminal procedures, 
as well as to the fact that concerns regarding the economy would possibly override respect for 
privacy for some governments, again entailing a risk for the proper and impartial application 
of the data protection rules. These situations have a highly hypothetical character and it 
                                                 
98 See Anne Smith, ‘The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?’ 
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hardly seems reasonable to immunise an entire administrative body with important coercive 
powers from political supervision in order to prevent these situations from derailing. 
 One of the main characteristics of administrative law is the constant need to balance 
the general interest against individual interests or to mediate between different aspects of the 
general interest, which is often difficult. In 2014, we expect the executive to be fit for that 
task and to demonstrate, via the duty to give reasons, that an unbiased and well-thought-out 
balancing exercise has taken place. Unless it can be demonstrated that the executive holds a 
clearly identifiable interest in a certain sector,101 which yields a presumption of partiality, 
ensuring an unbiased judgment in administrative decision-making is not a sufficient ground 
for granting (even a moderate form of) political independence. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This contribution aimed to demonstrate that international and European (regional) 
organisations have increasingly become advocates for the use of APBs and have expressed 
this preference in both soft law instrument and clear-cut legal obligations, anchored in 
treaties, legislation and case law. There is still incipient awareness of this subtle influence of 
supra-state law on national administrative organisation. After an overview of the most 
important examples of this tendency in a European context, the validity of the rationales 
behind the trend was assessed. It was argued that the far-reaching account of political 
independence advocated for supervisory bodies at EU level in particular is disproportionate in 
the light of the motives underlying the obligations, outlined above. In other words, complete 
political independence is not required for the fulfilment of any of these three motives. They 
are unfit as justifications for the requirements of independence, which makes them 
illegitimate infringements of the principle of (representative) democracy. 
 The trend of international and European impulse with regard to the creation of APBs 
is emerging and is likely to raise many more questions in the future. It is important that 
lawyers show an interest in such matters of administrative organisation. They should engage, 
to a greater degree than is now the case, in debates about the extent to which the use of APBs 
for the implementation of international and European law strikes a fair balance between valid 
motives for requiring political independence and common European constitutional principles 
impacting on decisions regarding administrative organisation. Administrative organisation is 
not neutral or value-free and it is up to lawyers to make that clear to policy makers, but also 
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to other academic disciplines studying similar topics. On that matter: the lack of 
interdisciplinary research on these questions is regrettable. Political scientists, economists and 
lawyers should perform more complementary and integrated research. Only then can we 
achieve models that are at the same time desirable from an economic viewpoint, expedient in 
terms of an efficient administration and permissible in the eyes of the law. 
